

Apsilankę svetainėje

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Peržiūrėkite popularią paskaitą apie proveržio technologijas

B111 Kriptologija 1

- [111_001_Introd-Skills-of-Mass-Disruption.pdf](#)
- [111_001_2023_09_06_13_34_55_547.mp4](#)

Homomorphic CryptoSystems: Computation with encrypted data in Data Center.

Declare **Public Parameters** to the network $PP = (p, g)$; $p = 268435019$; $g = 2$;In real cryptosystem is chosen having 2048 bits and is of order $p = 2^{2048} \sim 10^{700}$, i.e. $|p| = 2048$ bits.In our simulation we use $|p| = 2048$ bits, i.e. $p < 2^{28} = 268\,435\,456$.

$$PK_A = x; \text{ Priv}_A = a: a = g^x \text{ mod } p.$$

Received encrypted incomes $\mathcal{I}_1, \mathcal{I}_2$ from B_1, B_2


$$B_1: \mathcal{I}_1 = 2000 \rightarrow n_1 = g^{\mathcal{I}_1} \text{ mod } p \rightarrow \text{Enc}(a, i_1, n_1) = c_{1a} = (E_{1a}, D_{1a})$$

$$B_2: \mathcal{I}_2 = 3000 \rightarrow n_2 = g^{\mathcal{I}_2} \text{ mod } p \rightarrow \text{Enc}(a, i_2, n_2) = c_{2a} = (E_{2a}, D_{2a})$$

Total income of Alice is: $\mathcal{I}_{12} = \mathcal{I}_1 + \mathcal{I}_2 \text{ mod } (p-1)$ Since $\mathcal{I}_1 + \mathcal{I}_2 < p-1$, then $\mathcal{I}_1 + \mathcal{I}_2 \text{ mod } (p-1) = \mathcal{I}_1 + \mathcal{I}_2$ 

Query (Total Incomes)

$$c_{12a} = (E_{12a}, D_{12a})$$



$$\text{Dec}(x, c_{12a}) = n_{12}$$

$$n_{12} = n_1 \cdot n_2 \text{ mod } p = g^{\mathcal{I}_1} g^{\mathcal{I}_2} \text{ mod } p = g^{\mathcal{I}_1 + \mathcal{I}_2} \text{ mod } p = g^{\mathcal{I}_{12}} \text{ mod } p$$

Having n_{12} Alice finds \mathcal{I}_{12} by the search procedure from the equation:

$$n_{12} = g^{\mathcal{I}_{12}} \text{ mod } p: \mathcal{I}_{12} = 100, 200, 300, \dots, 5000.$$

$$\left. \begin{aligned} E_{1a} &= n_1 \cdot a^{i_1} \text{ mod } p \\ E_{2a} &= n_2 \cdot a^{i_2} \text{ mod } p \end{aligned} \right\} \begin{aligned} E_{1a} \cdot E_{2a} &= n_1 \cdot n_2 \cdot a^{i_1} \cdot a^{i_2} \text{ mod } p = \\ &= n_{12} \cdot a^{i_1 + i_2} \text{ mod } p = \\ &= g^{\mathcal{I}_{12}} \cdot a^{i_{12}} \text{ mod } p = E_{12a} \end{aligned}$$

$$i_{12} = (i_1 + i_2) \text{ mod } (p-1).$$

$$\left. \begin{aligned} D_{1a} &= g^{i_1} \text{ mod } p \\ D_{2a} &= g^{i_2} \text{ mod } p \end{aligned} \right\} \begin{aligned} D_{1a} \cdot D_{2a} &= g^{i_1} \cdot g^{i_2} \text{ mod } p = \\ &= a^{i_1 + i_2} \text{ mod } p = \end{aligned}$$

$$D_2 = g^{i_2} \text{ mod } p \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \text{with } i_1 \\ \text{with } i_2 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{with } i_1 \\ \text{with } i_2 \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{with } i_1 \\ \text{with } i_2 \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{with } i_1 \\ \text{with } i_2 \end{array} \\ = g^{i_1+i_2} \text{ mod } p = \\ = g^{i_{12}} \text{ mod } p = D_{12}a$$

$$C_{12}a = (E_{1a} \cdot E_{2a}, D_{1a} \cdot D_{2a}) = (E_{12}a, D_{12}a)$$

Realization:

For ElGamal Encryption, ElGamal Signature, Schnorr Identification, Schnorr Signature and Schnorr Homomorphic Multisignatures the same Public Parameters (PP) are used.

PP = (p, g), where p - is a strong prime number defining set $Z_p^* = \{1, 2, 3, \dots, p-1\}$, and g - is a generator in Z_p^* , i.e. $g \in \Gamma$ where Γ is a set of generators.

If p is a strong prime then $p = 2 \cdot q + 1$, when q - is also prime.

Then for all $g \in \Gamma$ the following conditions hold:

$$g^q \neq 1 \text{ mod } p; \text{ and } g^2 \neq 1 \text{ mod } p. \quad (*)$$

For example. Let $p=11$ and is prime, then since $p=2 \cdot 5+1$ and $q=5$ - is also prime, then p is a **strong prime**. In this case $\Gamma = \{2, 6, 7, 8\}$.

>> p=int64(genstrongprime(28))	Finding a generator in $Z_p^* = \{1, 2, 3, \dots, p-1\}$:
>> p=int64(268435019)	>> g=2;
p = 268435019	>> mod_exp(g,q,p)
>> isprime(p)	ans = 268435018
ans = 1	>> mod_exp(g,2,p)
>> q=(p-1)/2	ans = 4
q = 134217509	
>> isprime(q)	
ans = 1	

Encryption-decryption formulas

$$\mathcal{B}_1: m_1 = 2000$$

$$n_1 = g^{m_1} \text{ mod } p$$

$$i_1 \leftarrow \text{randi}(\mathcal{I}_p^*)$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} E_{1a} = n_1 \cdot a^{i_1} \text{ mod } p \\ D_{1a} = g^{i_1} \text{ mod } p \end{array} \right\} c = (E_{1a}, D_{1a})$$

$$\mathcal{B}_2: m_2 = 3000$$

$$n_2 = g^{m_2} \text{ mod } p$$

$$i_2 \leftarrow \text{randi}(\mathcal{I}_p^*)$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} E_{2a} = n_2 \cdot a^{i_2} \text{ mod } p \\ D_{2a} = g^{i_2} \text{ mod } p \end{array} \right\} c = (E_{2a}, D_{2a})$$

$$C_{12}a = C_{1a} \cdot C_{2a} = (E_{1a} \cdot E_{2a} \text{ mod } p, D_{1a} \cdot D_{2a} \text{ mod } p) = (E_{12}a, D_{12}a)$$

A

\mathcal{B}_1 encryption

\mathcal{B}_2 encryption

```
>> x=int64(randi(p-1))
x = 132355164
>> a=mod_exp(g,x,p)
a = 133074594
```

```
>> m1=2000
m1 = 2000
>> n1=mod_exp(g,m1,p)
n1 = 28125784
>> i1=int64(randi(p-1))
```


```
>> m2=3000
m2 = 3000
>> n2=mod_exp(g,m2,p)
n2 = 222979214
>> i2=int64(randi(p-1))
```

```
>> a=mod_exp(g,x,p)
a = 133074594
```

```
>> n1=mod_exp(g,m1,p)
n1 = 28125784
>> i1=int64(randi(p-1))
i1 = 206540100
>> a_i1=mod_exp(a,i1,p)
a_i1 = 167272090
>> E1a=mod(n1*a_i1,p)
E1a = 226124867
>> D1a=mod_exp(g,i1,p)
D1a = 204839485
```

```
>> n2=mod_exp(g,m2,p)
n2 = 222979214
>> i2=int64(randi(p-1))
i2 = 217548496
>> a_i2=mod_exp(a,i2,p)
a_i2 = 143126196
>> E2a=mod(n2*a_i2,p)
E2a = 23870093
>> D2a=mod_exp(g,i2,p)
D2a = 127689043
```

```
> E12a=mod(E1a*E2a,p)
E12a = 35955571
>> D12a=mod(D1a*D2a,p)
D12a = 117126824
```



E1a = 226124867
E2a = 23870093
D1a = 204839485
D2a = 127689043

Alice is able to decrypt

$C = (E_{12}a, D_{12}a)$ using her $PrK_A = X$.

- $D_{12}a^{-x \text{ mod } (p-1)} \text{ mod } p$
- $E \cdot D^{-x} \text{ mod } p = m_{12}$

```
>> mx=mod(-x,p-1)
mx = 136079854
>> D12a_mx=mod_exp(D12a,mx,p)
D12a_mx = 23180506
>>
>> nn12=mod(E12a*D12a_mx,p)
nn12 = 143845522
>>
>> n12=mod(n1*n2,p)
n12 = 143845522
```

$Ax = b \rightarrow \text{rašti } x$.